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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Defendants cannot avoid having to defend themselves against the allegations of 
tortious conduct set forth in Stilwyn's Second Amended Complaint based on the doctrine of res 
judicata. The district court dismissed Stilwyn's complaint, concluding that Stilwyn's 
"involvement" as an intervenor in a prior declaratory judgment action in the Idaho Federal 
District Court (the "Federal Case") barred the claims Stilwyn has asserted here. The district 
court determined that Stilwyn should have made counterclaims and third-party claims there, even 
though no claims were first made against Stilwyn. There is no rule of law that compelled 
Stilwyn to assert counterclaims against non-existent claims or to bring claims against third-
parties in the Federal Case. Consistent with the plain language of I.R.C.P. 13( a), courts require a 
claim by an "opposing party" to first be asserted against the prospective counterclaimant before 
the filing of a counterclaim becomes compulsory. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata has no 
application to bar Stilwyn's claims. Because the lower court's decision focused on Stilwyn's 
involvement in the Federal Case, it is necessary to set forth the genesis of and procedural history, 
decision, and judgment in that case. 1 
1 Stilwyn refers the Court to its Statement of Undisputed Facts (R. Vol. II, p. 517-28) and the 
Affidavit of B. Newal Squyres (R. Vol. III-IV, p. 536-1046) as the factual basis for the 
statements made herein. These pleadings were filed with the district court in support of its 
Memorandum in Opposition to IFB's Motion for Summary Judgment. No opposition was filed 
to either pleading by IFB or the other Defendants. 
- 1 -
A. THE FEDERAL CASE WAS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION BROUGHT BY 
ANACONDA INVESTMENTS, LLC, AND PORTFOLIO FB-IDAHO, LLC, AGAINST 
THE FDIC. STILWYN INTERVENED AS A DEFENDANT. No CLAIMS WERE MADE 
AGAINST STILWYN OR BY STILWYN. 
The plaintiffs in the Federal Case were Anaconda Investments, LLC, and Portfolio FB-
Idaho, LLC. The named defendant was the FDIC. R. Vol. II, p. 518-19; Vol. III, p. 555-60. 
Anaconda and Portfolio sought a declaratory judgment that they, rather than the FDIC, owned a 
58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan. Id That Loan became the property of the FDIC when the 
First Bank ofldaho in Ketchum failed and was taken over by the FDIC in the Spring of 2009. 
R. Vol. III, p. 580, iii! 10-11. 
The FDIC thereafter put its 58% interest in the Loan up for purchase in a bank-only 
auction. Id. There are very strict rules and requirements for participation in such an auction, 
intended to prevent any person or entity other than a bank from participating, either directly or 
indirectly, in the bid and acquiring an interest in the loan prior to closing. See R. Vol. III p. 579-
82, 759-62. In late September 2009, Idaho First Bank of McCall ("IFB") submitted the winning 
bid in the bank-only auction. R. Vol. III, p. 557. Before submitting its bid, however, IFB-
through its president Greg Lovell (who had previously been the president of the failed Ketchum 
bank)2 - had been working with a group of investors, led by Robert Kantor and Michael Page 
from Ketchum, who wanted to acquire the Stilwyn Loan. R. Vol. III, p. 762-65. Three days 
after submitting the bid, Mr. Kantor and Mr. Page, through their controlled legal entities, formed 
Anaconda on October 2, 2009, "for the purpose of acquiring one loan from [IFB]." R. Vol. IV, 
2 R. Vol. IV, p. 898, L 6-25. 
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p. 1020, 1028. Shortly after being told it was the winning bidder, IFB agreed to sell its interest 
in the Loan to newly-created Anaconda. See R. Vol. III, p. 737-40. 
But, prior to closing its acquisition of the Loan from the FDIC, IFB got caught. R. Vol. 
III, p. 659, ,i 12. The FDIC discovered IFB had violated the bank-only auction rules by virtue of 
its dealings with Anaconda. Id. at 659-61. The FDIC refused to close on IFB's attempted 
acquisition of the Loan, and the FDIC and IFB agreed to rescind the transaction. Id. at 660, 
,i,i 14-15. 
Nonetheless, IFB thereafter purported to assign its interest in the Stilwyn Loan to 
Anaconda. Id. at 660, ,i 18. And Anaconda in turn purported to assign its interest to Portfolio. 
Id. at 660-61, ,i 19; R. Vol. IV, p. 986. In February 2010, Portfolio filed of record in Blaine 
County a Notice of Assignment and a lis pendens on the property securing the Loan. R. Vol. III, 
p. 661, ,i 22. The FDIC protested and demanded that Portfolio remove the lis pendens and 
release the assignment. Id. at 661, ,i 21. 
Portfolio's response was to file, along with Anaconda, a declaratory judgment action in 
state court seeking (1) a declaration that their acquisition of the Loan had closed and 
(2) requiring the FDIC to transfer the documents necessary to vest title to the Loan in them. 
R. Vol. III, p. 555-60. The declaratory judgment action was removed to federal court by the 
FDIC based on the federal statutes involved and the existence of federal question jurisdiction. 
Id at564-74. 
After removal, Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment on undisputed facts. R. Vol. II, p. 305-18; R. Vol. III, p. 591-93, 642-44. The FDIC's 
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cross-motion was based on its counterclaim that Anaconda/Portfolio had violated a federal 
statute by recording the assignment and lis pendens. R. Vol. III, p. 645-62. The FDIC did not 
move for summary judgment on its second counterclaim for slander of title. Id. 
On the eve of the hearing on the cross-motions, Stilwyn sought to intervene to file 
briefing in support of the FDIC's opposition to the Anaconda/Portfolio motion. R. Vol. III, 
p. 673-706. Over the objections of Anaconda/Portfolio based on the contention that Stilwyn had 
no protectable interest in the rights to its Loan, the Court granted the motion. Id. at 717-24; 
725-34. Stilwyn filed its opposition papers to Anaconda/Portfolio's motion for summary 
judgment in late December 2010. Id. at 735-85. 
Of particular significance here, the plaintiffs, Anaconda and Portfolio, did not amend 
their complaint to assert claims for relief against Stilwyn. Given the limited nature of its 
intervention, Stilwyn made no claims or asserted any causes of action against the plaintiffs or the 
FDIC. Thus neither Anaconda/Portfolio nor Stilwyn made claims against each other in the 
Federal Case. 
B. THE FEDERAL COURT GRANTED THE FDIC's MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, RULING THAT IFB (AND THUS ANACONDA AND PORTFOLIO) ACQUIRED 
No RIGHTS OR INTEREST IN THE STILWYN LOAN-THEIR ATTEMPTED ASSIGNMENTS 
FAILED. 
After oral argument in late January, Judge Winmill issued the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order on February 13, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 305-18. The Court found that the 
IFB/FDIC transaction never closed because IFB, in its dealings with Anaconda, materially 
breached the bank-only requirements of the auction. Therefore, IFB never obtained any rights or 
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interest in the Stilwyn Loan. Id. at 315-16. Thus neither Anaconda nor Portfolio could derive, 
obtain, or claim any interest in the Stilwyn Loan based on IFB's unlawful attempted assignment 
to Anaconda. The Court held that IFB, Anaconda, and Portfolio had no right or interest in the 
Stilwyn Loan. Id. It followed from this conclusion that IFB never had any rights in the Stilwyn 
Loan to assign to Anaconda. And the FDIC thus had always retained its interest in the Loan. 
The Court ruled that the subsequent attempt by Anaconda to assign its interest to Portfolio 
violated the federal statute. 
The Court granted the FDIC's motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at 316-18. The 
only remaining issue in the Federal Case was the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim, which 
was set for trial in late July 2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 829-34; see also R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85. 
C. THE FEDERAL CASE WAS THEREAFTER DISMISSED BY AN AMENDED JUDGMENT BASED 
ON A STIPULATION UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 4l(a) BY THE FDIC AND ANACONDA! 
PORTFOLIO. STILWYN WAS NOT MADE A PARTY TO THE STIPULATION, AS NO CLAIMS 
HAD BEEN MADE BY OR AGAINST IT. THE AMENDED JUDGMENT DOES NOT REFER TO 
STILWYN. 
Although Anaconda/Portfolio brought in new counsel (W. Marcus W. Nye) to work with 
the Ludwig firm, the procedural posture of the case did not change.3 R. Vol. IV, p. 803-05. That 
is, Anaconda/Portfolio did not file claims against the FDIC or Stilwyn. And Stilwyn filed no 
claims against Anaconda/Portfolio. Stilwyn later filed a motion seeking to participate as a party 
in the upcoming trial on the FDIC's slander oftitle claim. Id. at 851-53. The motion was 
vigorously opposed by Anaconda/Portfolio and was withdrawn. R. Vol. IV, p. 859-66, 867-69. 
Stilwyn had no further involvement in the Federal Case. Thereafter, a Stipulation for Dismissal 
3 No other party joined or was joined in the Federal Case. 
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pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(l) was entered into by the parties, Anaconda, Portfolio, and the 
FDIC, to dismiss the Federal Case in its entirety. R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85. The Court entered an 
Amended Judgment based on the Stipulation. Id at 889-90. Stilwyn was not a signatory to the 
Stipulation and was not listed on the caption or otherwise referenced in the Amended Judgment. 
Id.; see also R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85. 
The only claim litigated and fully adjudicated to conclusion in the Federal Case was the 
claim for declaratory judgment made by Anaconda/Portfolio that they, and not the FDIC, owned 
the Stilwyn Loan. R. Vol. IV, p. 889-90. That claim was decided based on the undisputed facts 
before the Court on the Anaconda/Portfolio and FDIC motions for summary judgment.4 The 
Federal Case concluded with no appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant Stilwyn, Inc. appeals from the district court's decision on summary judgment 
that it is barred from bringing tort claims against the Defendants by virtue of its participation as 
an intervenor in a prior declaratory judgment action, the Federal Case described above. 
After the Federal Case was over, Stilwyn filed this case in the Fall of 2011 seeking 
damages sustained based on the tortious conduct of a number of parties, only two of which were 
parties to the Federal Case. R. Vol. I, p. 17-43. Stilwyn thereafter removed several individuals 
from the scope of its allegations and filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on 
4 IFB did not seek to intervene in the Federal Case to either explain or defend its conduct and 
dealings with Anaconda that resulted in the Court's decision that IFB had violated the 
requirements of the bank-only auction. R. Vol. II, p. 388, 111. 
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March 20, 2012. Id. at 70-96. The various Defendants divided themselves into four groups and 
with the exception of Mr. Kantor, who appeared prose, were represented by three law firms. 5 
The Second Amended Complaint was answered by all the Defendants, with the exception of 
those originally represented by Mr. Greener's firm and, as expected, denied virtually all of the 
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 116-32, 133-36, 137-40. The facts 
underlying Stilwyn's claims are therefore in dispute. 
IFB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 9, 2013 on the grounds that 
Stilwyn's claims were barred by the doctrine ofresjudicata. R. Vol. II, p. 381-83. The other 
Defendants sat on the sidelines for almost a month. On April 5, 2013, Defendant Robert A. 
Kantor and Defendants Rokan Corporation and Rokan Partners joined IFB's motion for 
summary judgment. Id at 427-29, 430-39. The Page Defendants6 then filed their notice of 
joinder on April 9, 2013. Id. at 454-56. None of these joinder notices added anything of 
substance to IFB' s briefing; they were simply tag-along motions, and there was no question that 
IFB was manning the laboring oar and would take the lead at oral argument, which it did. 
Stilwyn opposed the motions for summary judgment, arguing that its claims were not 
compulsory counterclaims in the Federal Case and were not barred by application of res 
5 Prior to this appeal, the Greener firm filed notices that it represented all Defendants with the 
exception of IFB. 
6 At the time of filing the joinder, the "Page Defendants" included Michael Page, Michael 
Edward Page Trust, Michael Page 2008 Revocable Trust, John Sofro, Bryan Furlong, Wali 
Investments, David Wali, Anaconda Investments, Anaconda Managers, Portfolio FB-Idaho, 
Rokan Property Services and Rokan Financial Services. 
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judicata.7 The Defendants filed reply memoranda. Id. at 1047-72, 1073-80, 1081-87. The 
district court heard oral argument on June 18, 2013. 
On this record, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 23, 2013. R. Vol. V, p. 1091-102. The court applied 
the doctrine of res judicata, specifically, claim preclusion, to find that Stilwyn should have and 
could have asserted all of its claims (counterclaims and third-party claims) in the Federal Case. 
On September 12, 2013, the district court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of all 
Defendants and dismissed the case in its entirety. Id. at 1133-35. Stilwyn timely filed its Notice 
of Appeal on September 17, 2013. Id. at 1136-41. 
The Defendants all requested an award of attorney fees and costs under LC.§§ 12-121 
and 12-123. R. Vol. V, p. 1112-24, 1142-1200, 1201-73, 1277-86. On December 2, 2013 (filed 
December 26, 2013), the district court entered its Memorandum Opinion on Motion for Costs 
and Attorney's Fees. Id. at 1296-1304. In its discretion, the district court denied the Defendants' 
motions for attorney fees, but granted an award of costs in the amount of $61.00 to the Page 
Defendants and $58.00 to IFB. Id. at 1303. 
B. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON APPEAL. 
There is nothing from the Federal Case to justify the district court's decision that res 
judicata precludes the tort claims made in this case.8 The district court failed to appreciate the 
7 Stilwyn's opposition papers to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment are found at 
Vol. II, p. 457 through Vol. IV, p. 1046 of the Clerk's Record on Appeal. Stilwyn's 
Memorandum in Opposition to IFB's motion for summary judgment is found at Vol. II, p. 461-
500. 
- 8 -
relationship and authoritative significance ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) to the 
application of res judicata. Because no claims were made against it by Anaconda/Portfolio, there 
was no "opposing party" with a claim against Stilwyn that it was required to counter by the 
compulsory counterclaim provisions of Rule 13(a).9 Courts uniformly apply Rule 13(a) as it 
reads to require a claim by an opposing party against the prospective counterclaimant in the first 
instance. In addition, based on this Court's decisions in Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 962, 965, 
472 P.2d 328,331 (1970) and Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120-
122, 219 P.3d 440, 445-446 (2009) reh 'g denied, the district court's decision should be reversed 
so that Stilwyn may have its day in court. 
Joseph v. Darrar held that res judicata does not apply to the litigation of counterclaims 
and only actions properly classified as Rule 13(a) counterclaims are barred by a failure to raise 
them in an earlier action. Moreover, the analysis of both the majority and the dissenting opinions 
in Kootenai Electric lead to the conclusion that the district court must be reversed. Stilwyn was 
not required to plead a compulsory counterclaim against nonexistent claims under Rule 13(a). 
And, even assuming Stilwyn could have pursued a permissive counterclaim absent an opposing 
8 "The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel)." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 PJd 613, 
617 (2007); see Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Stilwyn will 
use the term res judicata as synonymous with claim preclusion. Collateral estoppel ( or issue 
preclusion) is not involved in this case. 
9 The permissive provisions of Rule 13(b) likewise require the existence of an opposing party 
who has made claims against the potential counterclaimant. 
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party that had made claims against it, Stilwyn did not make a permissive counterclaim that it 
brought and pursued to a conclusion. 
Following this Court's prior precedent and applying Rule 13(a), the Court can resolve 
this case without the need to delve further into res judicata and each of its elements - same 
parties, same claims, and a final judgment. Even so, none of the elements of claim preclusion 
apply here. IFB and the Rokan/Page Defendants 10 were not parties to the Federal Case. They 
have no basis to use that case and res judicata as a shield to avoid defending themselves on the 
merits for the wrongful conduct alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. There is no rule of 
law compelling Stilwyn to assert claims against non-parties. 
Moreover, the same claim element is lacking. Stilwyn did not have any claims pied 
against it, and it was not compelled to plead counterclaims. And finally, the Amended Judgment 
entered in the Federal Case does not purport to cover or relate to the claims being made by 
Stilwyn here. On its face, the Amended Judgment applies only to the claims adjudicated by the 
federal court's Memorandum Decision and Order on the cross-motions for summary judgment 
and to "the only claim remaining in the case" - the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim. R. Vol. 
IV, p. 889-90. Anaconda/Portfolio did not make Stilwyn a party to the Stipulation for Dismissal 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(l). R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85. Having made that choice-the appropriate 
one under the facts and circumstances - they ( and the non-party Defendants) cannot use the 
10 The Rokan/Page Defendants are fully identified at paragraphs 5-11 and 14-21 of the Second 
Amended Complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 71-75. Furthermore, paragraph 39 describes these parties as 
being led by Robert Kantor and Michael Page, who used legal entities and created new legal 
entities (including some of the named Defendants) to facilitate the wrongful conduct alleged in 
the complaint. Other Defendants include investors in these various legal entities. Id at p. 78. 
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Amended Judgment as a shield to this case. The Amended Judgment entered pursuant to the 
Rule 4 l(a)(l) Stipulation cannot be effective for purposes of claim preclusion against an 
intervenor who did not execute the stipulation. Stilwyn is not seeking to relitigate any issue 
decided in the Federal Case or subject to the Amended Judgment. The district court misapplied 
the law in concluding that the three res judicata elements were met. 
Finally, this is an appropriate case for this Court to adopt the rule and reasoning from 
Section 3 3 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments limiting the application of res judicata in 
the context of a declaratory judgment action. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted Section 33 to 
limit claim preclusion to only those claims actually litigated and decided in a case where the first 
suit was for declaratory judgment. 
Stilwyn respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of summary 
judgment and remand the case for trial. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error as a matter of law in its 
interpretation, construction, and application of I.R.C.P. 13(a), and its conclusion that Stilwyn 
was required to assert compulsory counterclaims and third-party claims in the Federal Case? 
2. Did the district court commit reversible error as a matter of law in its 
interpretation, construction, and application of the doctrine of res judicata ( claim preclusion) and 
its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by reason of Stilwyn's involvement in the 
Federal Case? 
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3. Did the district court commit reversible error as a matter of law in failing to adopt 
and apply the declaratory judgment exception found in Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 33 
to the facts of this case? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court exercises free review over the question whether an action is barred by res 
judicata. Kootenai Electric, 148 Idaho at 120, 219 P .3d at 444. And the burden to establish res 
judicata was on IFB and the other Defendants who joined its motion. Id. "When reviewing a 
district court's grant of summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard a district court 
uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion." C. Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 
561, 181 P.3d 485,487 (2008). The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to 
show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court must "liberally construe ... the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draw ... all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in that party's favor. Liberty Nw. Ins. Co. v. Spudnik Equip. Co., LLC, 155 Idaho 
730,733,316 P.3d 646,649 (2013) citing Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 
P.3d 606,608 (2002). Thus, all facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. C. Systems, 145 Idaho at 561, 181 P.3d at 487. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. STILWYN WAS NOT REQUIRED BY RULE 13 TO PLEAD COUNTERCLAIMS 
AGAINST ANACONDA/PORTFOLIO OR TO BRING THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS 
AGAINST NON-PARTIES IN THE FEDERAL CASE. THE DISTRICT COURT 
THEREFORE ERRED IN DISMISSING STILWYN'S CLAIMS BASED ON RES 
JUDICATA. 
The district court granted summary judgment to IFB and the other Defendants, saying 
that claim preclusion bars Stilwyn from bringing claims that "could have and should have" been 
raised in the Federal Case. Stilwyn's "involvement" as an intervenor-defendant in the Federal 
Case declaratory judgment action did not compel Stilwyn to make counterclaims and third-party 
claims as a matter of law on the undisputed facts here. The district court reasoned that simply by 
joining the Federal Case as an intervenor, Stilwyn was required not only to make counterclaims 
against the plaintiffs - Anaconda and Portfolio - but to also join and make claims against all of 
the Defendants here - including IFB and other non-parties to the Federal Case. Such an 
expansive use of res judicata to protect these parties from having to defend this case on the 
merits finds no support in the law interpreting Rule 13 or applying res judicata in the context of 
counterclaims. Stilwyn was not required to plead counterclaims in the Federal Case unless 
Anaconda/Portfolio had first asserted claims against it. Absent such claims, there is no 
"opposing party" making claims against Stilwyn for it to counter. 
The following statements illustrate the district court's misreading of Rule 13, the doctrine 
of claim preclusion, and how Stilwyn's intervention in the Federal Case relates to the legal 
analysis: 
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• "[T]he fact that [Stilwyn] never actually litigated its claims is irrelevant. The 
question of claim preclusion turns on whether the claims could have and should 
have been raised." R. Vol. V, p. 1098. 
• "[A]ll of [Stilwyn's] claims against Defendants should have been raised in the 
Federal Case. Clearly they could have been." Id. 
• "[Stilwyn's] arguments to the contrary are well-crafted, but to rule for the Plaintiff 
would eviscerate the purposes of claim preclusion; the Federal Case was an 
available and appropriate forum for the resolution of all the issues in the case." 
Id. 
• "Stilwyn entered the case as a party as a matter of right. It had the same 
opportunity to bring claims as the other parties." R. Vol. V, p. 1099. 
• "Stilwyn chose to join the fray in the Federal Case and must live with the 
consequences." Id. 
Notably absent from these statements is any reference to I.R.C.P. 13. The district court's 
application of claim preclusion was premised on the mistaken conclusion that once Stilwyn 
joined the Federal Case as an intervenor, it was compelled to assert counterclaims and third-party 
claims. That conclusion would be valid only if Stilwyn had a claim made against it. If so, the 
existence of an "opposing party" then compels the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim under 
Rule 13(a), allows a permissive counterclaim under 13(b), or provides a basis to seek leave of 
court to file a permissive claim against third parties under Rule 14. 
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Without analysis or authority, the district court rejected Stilwyn's position (and the 
universal authority supporting it) that there were no claims Stilwyn was required to counter with 
a compulsory counterclaim. The court made no attempt to identify any claim for relief made 
against Stilwyn that would compel the assertion of a counterclaim. Nor did the court cite any 
authority for the proposition that a party, much less an intervenor in a declaratory judgment 
action with no claims made against it, is required to file third-party claims. 
The. "opportunity" to plead a counterclaim or seek leave to file a third-party claim does 
not equate to a res judicata bar against a party for not doing so. It is unclear whether the court 
used the words "should have" as its view oflegal policy or as a synonym for "must have." If the 
former, that is, a policy decision, the court has misapplied the law. Under the facts here, res 
judicata is not that broad a doctrine. The court failed to follow Idaho law that the assertion of a 
counterclaim is governed by Rule 13, not res judicata. It is true that if a party must plead a 
"compulsory" counterclaim it will be later barred (not by res judicata but by Rule 13(a)) from 
doing so. What a party "could have" done, however, is not a bar to the later assertion of claims, 
such as permissive counterclaims, that were not required to be pled as counterclaims under 
Rule 13(a). 11 
This illustrates another flaw in the district court's failure to consider the impact of 
Rule 13. Anaconda/Portfolio had a solid basis to blunt an effort by Stilwyn to expand the 
11 Stilwyn recognizes that the Kootenai Electric case supports the proposition that in certain 
circumstances when a party fully pursues to conclusion some, but not all, of its permissive 
claims, it will be barred from asserting other claims it could have raised in subsequent litigation. 
These are not the facts here, however, and this is not the law applicable to this case. 
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Federal Case. Anaconda/Portfolio could have said (and rightfully so)-we have made no claims 
against Stilwyn and thus no "counterclaim" can be made against us. There is no reason to 
believe or assume Anaconda/Portfolio would have made the decision to allow its simple, 
straightforward declaratory judgment action to explode into a case where it was litigating its 
liability in tort to the intervenor Stilwyn. Anaconda/Portfolio or a party in a similar factual and 
procedural setting without claims against the prospective counterclaimant could successfully use 
Rule 13 to avoid having to litigate counterclaims in its case. The district court's conclusion that 
res judicata now bars Stilwyn's claims because Stilwyn could have, should have, and had the 
opportunity to litigate all of its claims in the Federal Case is not supported by the facts or the 
law. 
B. BECAUSE ANACONDA/PORTFOLIO ASSERTED NO CLAIMS AGAINST STILWYN IN 
THEIR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, ANACONDA/PORTFOLIO WERE NOT 
AN "OPPOSING PARTY" UNDER RULE 13 AGAINST WHOM STILWYN WAS 
COMPELLED TO ASSERT COUNTERCLAIMS. 
The district court appeared to recognize the significance of Rule 13(a). It began the 
"Discussion and Analysis" in its Memorandum Decision quoting the Rule and acknowledging 
Stilwyn's argument that under the Rule it was not required to assert a claim in the Federal Case. 
R. Vol. V, p. 1095; R. Vol. II, p. 469-73. However, without any discussion, analysis, or citation 
to authority, the district court summarily disposed of the Rule 13 analysis by stating "[Stilwyn] 
should have raised claims and arguably did, and are barred from raising claims here." R. Vol. V, 
p. 1095. Having reached this conclusion, the court was then free to move on and rule that 
Stilwyn's claims in this case were barred by the res judicata effect of the Federal Case. 
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Although there are any number of flaws with the district court's analysis, its failure to 
properly apply Rule 13 is dispositive of this appeal and requires that its decision be reversed. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides as follows: 
Rule 13(a). Compulsory Counterclaims. 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the 
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing 
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim .... 
I.R.C.P. 13(a) (emphasis added). 12 
The district court side-stepped the Rule 13(a) analysis in one sentence, concluding that 
Stilwyn should have raised claims in the Federal Case. R. Vol. V, p. 1095. The court's 
conclusion overlooks the plain language of Rule 13(a) that a pleader shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim against an "opposing party." It is undisputed that Anaconda/Portfolio's declaratory 
judgment action did not plead a claim against Stilwyn. R. Vol. III, p. 355-60. Indeed, 
Anaconda/Portfolio opposed Stilwyn's motion to intervene on the basis that Stilwyn had no 
rights in the loan that was the subject of the declaratory judgment action. R. Vol. III, p. 717-24. 
It is likewise undisputed that Stilwyn did not plead a claim for relief against Anaconda/Portfolio. 
Id. at 673-716. 
12 Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is identical in substance to I.R.C.P. 
13(a) provides that a pleader must assert as a compulsory counterclaim "any claim that- at the 
time of its service - the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; and (B) does 
not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 13(a)(l). 
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The precise question presented, therefore, is whether Anaconda/Portfolio was an 
"opposing party" against whom Stilwyn was required to plead a counterclaim, even though 
Anaconda/Portfolio did not ever assert a claim for relief against Stilwyn. This issue has not been 
expressly considered on similar facts by the Idaho courts. The dissenting opinion in Kootenai 
Electric does address the issue in a little different factual context, and its reasoning fully supports 
applying Rule 13(a) as Stilwyn argues here. And the majority opinion in Kootenai Electric 
likewise supports the conclusion that on the facts here Stilwyn was not required to pursue its 
claims in the Federal Case. 
Other jurisdictions have directly addressed the issue and readily concluded that Rule 
13(a) means what it says - an opposing party is one who has asserted a claim against the 
potential counterclaimant - and the existence of a counterclaim presupposes the existence of a 
claim against the party required to make the counterclaim. 13 Stilwyn is not aware of authority to 
the contrary. And neither the district court nor the parties cited authority for a contrary 
proposition in the proceedings below. 
Courts called upon to interpret Rule 13(a) have consistently held that the Rule 13(a) 
"opposing party" must have first asserted claims against the putative counterclaimant. In Noel v. 
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), for example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Washington's 
13 Idaho courts may look to federal law in interpreting similar or identical rules of civil 
procedure. See Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,398,247 P.3d 620, 
625 (2010) (federal case law provides persuasive authority when interpreting rules under the 
I.R.C.P. that are substantially similar to rules under the Fed. R. Civ. P.); see also Black v. 
Ameritel Inns, Inc., 139 Idaho 511,515, 81 P.3d 416,420 (2003); Scott v. Agric. Products 
Corp., 102 Idaho 147,149,627 P.2d 326,328 (1981). 
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identical version ofldaho Rule 13(a) to conclude that an "opposing party" is one who first 
asserted a claim against the prospective counterclaimant. Id. at 1170-71. The court quoted 
Nancy's Prod., Inc. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 61 Wash.App. 645, 811 P.2d 250,254 (1991) in which 
the court states: 
We hold that an opposing party for purposes of CR 13(a) is one 
who asserts a claim against the prospective counter claimant in the 
first instance. 
Nancy's Prod., 811 P.2d at 253. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. "It is self-evident that in order to have a 
counterclaim, there must first be a claim against the party asserting the counterclaim." Kearney 
v. A 'Hearn, 210 F.Supp. 10, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ajf'd 309 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1962); see Augustin 
v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1216 (8th Cir. 1975) ("An opposing party is one who asserts a claim 
against the prospective counterclaimant in the first instance."); United States v. Raefsky, 19 
F.R.D. 355,356 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ("A counterclaim pre-supposes the existence of a claim against 
the party filing the counterclaim."). 
Having no claims made against it, it is impossible for Stilwyn to be required to make a 
counterclaim to a non-existent claim. Pagnotti Enter., Inc. v. Beltrami, 787 F.Supp. 440,443 
(M.D. Pa. 1992) ("[Third-party plaintiff] is not being sued by any of the parties to this litigation, 
therefore it is impossible for it to file a claim to counter a non-existing claim."); see Black's Law 
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Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) ( defining "counterclaim" as "[a] claim for relief asserted against an 
opposing party after an original claim has been made"). 14 
Supported by the foregoing authority, Stilwyn was not required to make (or attempt to 
plead) counterclaims against Anaconda/Portfolio because they were not an "opposing party" who 
had first made claims against Stilwyn. The district court's decision should be reversed. This 
Court's decisions in Joseph v. Darrar, supra, and Kootenai Elec. Co-op. v. Lamar Corp., supra, 
lead to the same conclusion - the district court committed reversible error by its conclusion that 
Stilwyn' s claims here are barred by res judicata because they should have been made in the 
Federal Case. 
1. The Res Judicata Doctrine is Inapplicable to the Litigation of 
Counterclaims. 
In Joseph v. Darrar, this Court held that the res judicata doctrine does not apply to the 
litigation of counterclaims. 93 Idaho at 766, 472 P.2d at 332 ("It is our opinion that the res 
judicata principle is inapplicable to the litigation of counterclaims. . . . Only actions on claims 
14 Contrary to the district court's implication at oral argument that definitions contained in 
Black's Law Dictionary are not useful to the interpretation of civil rules (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 31 L. 15 -
p. 34, L. 21), this Court has looked to Black's to define otherwise undefined terms when 
construing statutes and rules of civil procedure. See Telford v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 611, 301 
P.3d 264,269 (2013) (looking to Black's definition of term "final" contained in Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 59); Hayden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312-13, 109 
P.3d 161, 166-67 (2005) (looking to Black's in construing statute); City of Idaho Falls v. Beco 
Const. Co., Inc., 123 Idaho 516, 526, 850 P.2d 165, 175 (1993) (looking to Black's for definition 
of term "writ of execution" contained in I.R.C.P. 69); Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800 
P.2d 85, 88 (1990) (utilizing Black's definition of term "filing" contained in I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l); 
State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207,211, 307 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Ct. App. 2013) (utilizing Black's for 
plain meaning of phrase not defined by statute). This supplemental authority was provided to the 
district court prior to its summary judgment ruling. R. Vol. V, p. 1088-90. 
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properly classified in an earlier action as compulsory counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13(a) are 
barred by the failure to raise them in the earlier action[.]") 
Significantly, this Court rejected arguments that parallel the statements made by the 
district court to support its decision. See discussion supra Part V .A. In Joseph, the defendant 
argued that the plaintiffs claims were barred by "not only matters actually litigated and 
determined but also as to every matter which might or should have been litigated in the first 
suit." Joseph, 93 Idaho at 765, 472 P.2d at 331. Defendant also asserted that "since the court 
had before it both parties involved in the present action, the claim asserted here might and should 
have been raised and litigated in that case and that since it was not, it is now barred by res 
judicata." Id This Court disagreed, however, stating the plaintiff had "misapplied the doctrine 
of res judicata" because it does not apply to the litigation of counterclaims. 
It is our opinion, however, that [ defendant] has misapplied the 
doctrine of res judicata. Although he correctly stated that rule as it 
applies in certain instances, it is not applicable to the litigation of 
counterclaims. 
Id ( citations omitted). 
Directly contrary to the analysis of the district court, this Court stated: "[o]nly actions on 
claims properly classified in an earlier action as compulsory counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13(a) 
are barred by a failure to raise them in the earlier action, and this is a bar arising not from the 
concept ofresjudicata, but from I.R.C.P. 13 (a) itself." 93 Idaho at 766,472 P.2d at 332. 
Although the counterclaims in Joseph were permissive because they did not arise out of the same 
transaction which was the subject of the first action, the Court's reasoning and analysis control 
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here. To determine whether claims that would have been counterclaims in the first case are 
barred in a subsequent action, Idaho courts are governed by Rule 13. 
The district court, however, failed to engage in any Rule 13(a) analysis. The district 
court just jumped to the conclusion that Stilwyn "should have and could have" made claims in 
the Federal Case. This is the same type of faulty reasoning rejected by the Joseph court. 15 
This Court's decision in Kootenai Electric Co-op. v. Lamar, supra, is also instructive. 
KEC and Lamar were original co-defendants in the underlying federal case. KEC cross-claimed 
against Lamar seeking an apportionment of fault among all the parties. "The cross-claim did not 
specifically mention [the Idaho High Voltage Act (HVA)]. [D]uring the course of the litigation, 
KEC fleshed out its claims against Lamar, specifically asserting a claim under the HV A." 148 
Idaho at 121,219 P.3d at 445. After the jury rendered a verdict and apportioned liability, KEC 
moved for statutory indemnification against Lamar based on the HV A. The federal district court 
refused to rule on the motion post-trial because KEC had not pled statutory indemnification 
under the HVA in its cross-claim. Id. at 118,219 P.3d at 442. 
KEC then filed a separate lawsuit in Idaho state court against Lamar for statutory 
indemnification under the HV A. Lamar moved for summary judgment on the doctrine of res 
judicata. The district court first analyzed the motion under Rule 13(g) ( cross-claim against a co-
party) and then applied res judicata. In granting summary judgment to Lamar, the district court 
15 The district court does not even acknowledge this Court's decision in Joseph v. Darrar, 
despite it being very explicitly relied upon by Stilwyn. R. Vol. II, p. 4 70-73. 
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concluded that KEC could have and should have included the statutory indemnification claim 
when it originally filed its cross-claim for apportionment. Id. at 119, 219 P .3d at 443. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed. In a 3-2 decision the majority acknowledged that KEC 
was not required to bring a permissive cross-claim. Once it did, however, and pursued its claims, 
including its other HVA claims, to a conclusion, the Court reasoned that KEC could have and 
should have raised the additional HVA claim. Id. at 121-122, 219 P.3d at 445-446. Both the 
district court and the majority recognized the analytical interplay between Rule 13 and the 
principles of res judicata. And this Court, in affirming the lower court, emphasized the facts in 
the underlying case and KEC' s pursuit to conclusion of its opportunity to vindicate its rights 
against Lamar. These facts and analysis lend no support to the district court's decision here. 
The dissent drew a distinction between a permissive Rule 13(g) cross-claim and a Rule 
13(a) compulsory counterclaim. The dissent reasoned that if Lamar had sued KEC, then KEC 
would have been compelled to bring all claims it had against Lamar under Rule 13(a). Because 
KEC only filed a permissive cross-claim under Rule 13(g), however, it was not required to bring 
all claims it had against Lamar at that time. "Lamar had not sued KEC, so any claim by KEC 
against Lamar was not an I.R.C.P. 13(a) compulsory counterclaim." Id. at 123,219 P.3d at 447. 
The dissent thus decided that KEC was not an opposing party under Rule 13(a) and concluded, 
therefore, that res judicata did not apply. This analysis provides persuasive authority under the 
facts here for reversal. 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions lead to the conclusion that the district court's 
decision should be reversed. KEC sought affirmative relief by way of cross-claim against 
- 23 -
Lamar, thus becoming adverse and a plaintiff as between them. In this posture, and having 
pursued its claims to a conclusion, KEC was obligated to have asserted its other claim or be 
barred by operation of res judicata. The dissent took a narrower view, reasoning that KEC was 
not barred from bringing a claim against Lamar because KEC was not an opposing party to 
implicate the compulsory counterclaim requirements of Rule 13(a). 
Here, Stilwyn did not seek affirmative relief in the Federal Case and Anaconda/Portfolio 
sought no affirmative relief against Stilwyn so as to trigger a compulsory counterclaim under 
Rule 13(a). Under the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent in Kootenai Electric, 
therefore, the district court misapplied res judicata as a bar to the claims Stilwyn is making in 
this case. 
2. Stilwyn's Motion to Confirm Status Did Not Alter the Procedural 
Posture or Status Quo of the Federal Case and Thus Provides No 
Basis for the District Court's Decision to Apply Res Judicata. 
Following the federal court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the FDIC, the court 
denied Anaconda/Portfolio's motion for reconsideration and granted the FDIC's motion to 
enforce judgment requiring Anaconda/Portfolio to release the assignment filed in Blaine County. 
R. Vol. IV, p. 826-28, 847-50. Stilwyn thereafter filed a motion styled "Motion to Confirm 
Status as a Party· to Slander of Title Counterclaim" seeking to be a party in the upcoming trial on 
the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim. R. Vol. IV, p. 851-53. The basis for the request was 
that Stilwyn had participated in the litigation with respect to the FDIC's claim without objection. 
Nonetheless, Stilwyn knew it had not pled a claim for relief or for damages, and sought a ruling 
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that it be considered a "de facto party" for all purposes related to the FDIC's slander of title 
claim. Id. 
Anaconda/Portfolio "adamantly" opposed Stilwyn's motion. R. Vol. IV, p. 859-66. 
They asserted, correctly, that Stilwyn had never filed a pleading asserting a counterclaim against 
them for its (Stilwyn's) damages allegedly resulting from slander of title or had ever joined the 
FDIC's claim. As Anaconda/Portfolio stressed, "the Answer filed by Stilwyn does not contain a 
single counterclaim against Plaintiffs." Id. at 862 (emphasis in original). And they accurately 
stated, based on Stilwyn's intervention notice, that, "Stilwyn's exclusive purpose in intervening 
was to defend against the claims in the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint." Id. Stilwyn then 
withdrew its motion, saying that it would not participate further in the case related to the FDIC's 
slander of title counterclaim. Id. at 867-69. 
Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC subsequently agreed to resolve their dispute by a 
Rule 41(a)(l) Stipulation for Dismissal of the FDIC's counterclaim. Stilwyn was not a party to 
the Stipulation. Id. at 882-85. Based on the Stipulation, the Federal Case ended by an Amended 
Judgment that dismissed the FDIC's counterclaim, the only remaining claim in the case after the 
court's Memorandum Decision and Order on the cross-motion for summary judgment. Id. at 
889-90. 
Any reliance that the district court placed on the filing of the motion to confirm status 
was misplaced. R. Vol. V, p. 1093-94. As the court noted, the motion was not ruled upon. Id. 
The motion did not change the status quo or alter the relationship between Anaconda/Portfolio 
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and Stilwyn. Anaconda/Portfolio was not ever an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule 
13(a) against whom Stilwyn was compelled to file a counterclaim. 
3. Stilwyn Was Not Required by Any Rule of Law or Civil Procedure to 
Bring Its Claims Against Non-Parties in the Federal Case. 
The district court insisted that Stilwyn could have and should have brought its claims 
against non-parties (IFB and the Rokan/Page Defendants) in the Federal Case and that its failure 
to do so resulted in a res judicata bar to such claims in this case. 16 There is no Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure or binding authority for the proposition that a "non-party" to a prior suit 
qualifies as an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule 13(a). The Ninth Circuit, in Noel v. 
Hall, supra, concluded that "to interpret the term 'opposing party' in the context of the court 
rules so as to include a nonparty with an adverse interest is a non sequitur." Id. 341 F.3d at 
1170; citing Nancy's Prod., 811 P.2d at 253. 
In Noel, the Ninth Circuit applied Washington's version of Rule 13(a) to decide whether 
plaintiffs claims against two defendants, a husband and wife, were compulsory counterclaims 
that the plaintiff was required to have raised in a prior state court case in which the plaintiff 
(Noel) had been sued by the wife. The Ninth Circuit found that while the plaintiffs claims 
against the wife were compulsory counterclaims the plaintiff was required to have raised in the 
prior litigation (because the plaintiff had been sued by the wife), the plaintiffs claims against the 
husband were not compulsory counterclaims. The claims were not barred, the court reasoned, 
16 The district court's memorandum decision does not cite any rule which would compel Stilwyn 
to make third-party claims. 
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because the husband was not a party to the prior litigation and thus was not an "opposing party" 
under Rule 13(a). Noel, 341 F.3d at 1170. 
IFB and the Rokan/Page Defendants were not parties in the Federal Case, much less 
"opposing parties" under Rule 13(a). The district court's ruling improperly imposes a 
requirement that Stilwyn, as an intervenor with no claim made against it, had a mandatory 
obligation to bring IFB and the other Defendants into the Federal Case by way of a third-party 
complaint to prevent a res judicata bar to such claims. That is not the law. 
Third-party claims are expressly permissive. See I.R.C.P. 13(h) ("may be made parties"), 
I.R.C.P. 14 ("may cause to be served") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h), 14 (same; third-party claims 
are expressly permissive, not compulsory); see also, Temperance Ins. Exch. v. Carver, 83 Idaho 
487,491,365 P.2d 824, 826 (1961) (citation omitted) (the cross-pleadings allowed by I.R.C.P. 
13(g) and 18(a) are permissive, not coercive). Stilwyn is not barred because it did not bring non-
compulsory, permissive claims against these Defendants. 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT EXCEPTION TO 
RES JUDICATA, AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT DOING So. 
The Federal Case was a declaratory judgment action. The district court mischaracterized 
the nature of the Federal Case in stating that the "action in federal court was not merely a 
declaratory judgment or attachment case." R. Vol. V, p. 1099. The only issue decided on the 
merits by the Federal Case was that the FDIC was the rightful holder of the 58% interest in the 
Stilwyn loan. The FDIC's counterclaim for slander of title was not litigated to resolution and 
- 27 -
was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l) Stipulation. The Federal Case started and 
ended as a declaratory judgment action. 
Courts across the country routinely decline to apply the res judicata doctrine in a 
subsequent lawsuit where the first suit was for declaratory judgment. The legal support is found 
in Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 33, commonly referred to as the declaratory judgment 
exception. Although Idaho courts have adopted several sections of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments when called upon to decide issues involving res judicata, 17 endorsement and 
application of the declaratory judgment exception appears to be a matter of first impression. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33 provides: 
A valid and final judgment in an action brought to declare rights or 
other legal relations of the parties is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between them as to matters declared, and, in accordance 
with the rules of issue preclusion, as to any issues actually litigated 
by them and determined in the action. 
1 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 33 (1982); see also Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 196 (2nd Cir. 2010) (the preclusive effect of a declaratory 
judgment action applies only to matters declared and to any issues actually litigated and 
determined in the action); Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials Corp., 512 F.3d 912,916 (7th 
17 Idaho courts routinely look to the Restatement in analyzing claim and issue preclusion and cite 
favorably to the Restatement. See, e.g., Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 777, 186 P.3d 630, 
633 (2008) (citing Section 24 of the Restatement in analyzing whether subsequent lawsuit 
involved "same claim" for purposes of claim preclusion); Eastern Idaho Agric. Credit Ass 'n v. 
Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 408, 987 P .2d 314, 320 (1999) ( citing to Section 13 of the Restatement 
in addressing the finality of judgments for issue preclusion); Gilbert v. State, 119 Idaho 684, 686, 
809 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Ct. App. 1991) (court should look to relevant sections of Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments for guidance in deciding questions of res judicata."). 
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Cir. 2008) (res judicata does not apply when the only relief sought in the first suit is for 
declaratory judgment); Harborside Refrigerated Services, Inc. v. Vogel, 959 F.2d 368,372 (2nd 
Cir. 1992) (preclusive effect of declaratory judgment is limited to subject matter of declaratory 
relief sought); Cimasi v. Fenton, 838 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1988) (res judicata attaches only to 
precise issue presented and decided in the prior declaratory judgment action); Horn & Hardart 
Co. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 843 F.2d 546,549 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied 488 U.S. 
849 (1988) (courts limit the preclusive effect of a declaratory judgment action to the matters 
declared, permitting a later action seeking injunctive relief on the same cause of action); 
Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1983) (declaratory judgment only bars 
relitigation of issues actually decided). 
The only matter declared and actually decided in the Federal Case was the rightful holder 
of the 58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan. That decision is conclusive as between the FDIC, 
Anaconda/Portfolio, and Stilwyn. Stilwyn is not attempting to relitigate that issue. 
This Court should follow the vast majority of other jurisdictions that have applied the 
declaratory judgment exception. In Andrew Robinson Int'!, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 
F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008), the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Massachusetts law, 
canvassed the decisions in other jurisdictions regarding the declaratory judgment exception. The 
First Circuit found that "the vast majority of states that have addressed this problem 
unapologetically apply a special rule of claim preclusion, consistent with that of section 33 of the 
Second Restatement in the declaratory judgment context." Id. at 56. The First Circuit's survey 
found that the following jurisdictions had adopted the Restatement's rule of law: Alaska; 
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California; Colorado; Connecticut; Florida; Maryland; Missouri; New Hampshire; New Jersey; 
New Mexico; Ohio; and Texas. Id at 56 (citations omitted). 
Moreover, the court found that the following states used similar reasoning and adopted 
essentially the same rule, but without mentioning the Restatement: Kentucky; Mississippi, North 
Carolina; Oklahoma; South Carolina and Wisconsin. Id. at 56 ( citations omitted). 
In addition, the following federal courts, applying state law, have adopted the 
Restatement's approach: Seventh Circuit (applying Wisconsin law); Second Circuit (both 
federal and New York law recognize the declaratory judgment exception articulated in the 
Restatement); Northern District of Ohio (applying Ohio law); Southern District of New York 
( applying New York law). Id. at 56 ( citations omitted). 
And finally, the following federal courts have opined that federal common law embraces 
the rule: Eleventh Circuit; Seventh Circuit; Fifth Circuit; District of Massachusetts; District of 
Columbia; Western District of Washington; and District of Connecticut. Id. at 56 ( citations 
omitted). 
The policy rationale behind the declaratory judgment exception is articulated in Andrew 
Robinson. The court reasoned that the declaratory judgment mechanism (i.e., the prompt and 
efficient use to declare the legal relationships of parties) is frustrated if parties are required to 
bring all conceivable claims and counterclaims or risk having them later barred by the 
application of resjudicata. Andrew Robinson, 547 F.3d at 58. Therefore, the court concluded 
that public policy was furthered by the ready availability of a "no-strings-attached declaratory 
remedy that is simpler, faster, and less nuclear than a suit for coercive relief." Id. 
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That policy is furthered here. Anaconda/Portfolio sought a judicial determination of the 
legal rights to the 58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan as against the FDIC. No other claims were 
made and no other parties were included. Anaconda/Portfolio received a declaration of their 
rights - not the decision they wanted, but they got it in less than a year from filing the action to 
the entry of Amended Judgment without the burden of lengthy and expensive litigation. As 
demonstrated above, Stilwyn is not precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion from asserting 
its claims here solely based on its "involvement" as an intervenor in the Federal Case. This case 
provides an appropriate and timely opportunity for this Court to adopt Section 33 of the 
Restatement and provide guidance to lower courts and litigants regarding application of res 
judicata to declaratory judgment actions. 
D. IFB AND THE TAG-ALONG DEFENDANTS FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN TO 
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF CLAIM PRECLUSION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
"The burden of proof for res judicata is on the party asserting the affirmative defense and 
it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence." Kootenai 
Electric, 148 Idaho at 120,219 P.3d at 444, citing Ticor Title, 144 Idaho 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
The three requirements for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action are: (1) same parties; (2) 
same claims; and (3) final judgment. Id. ( citations omitted). The district court erred as a matter 
oflaw in finding that IFB and the tag-along Defendants met their burden of proof to show same 
parties, same claims, and final judgment. 
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1. IFB and the Other Defendant Do Not Receive any Preclusive Benefit 
from Anaconda/Portfolio's Declaratory Judgment Action. 
The district court erred in concluding that IFB was a privy to Anaconda and Portfolio for 
purposes of claim preclusion. The district court accepted, on its face, the assertion that the 
"contractual relationship between Anaconda and Idaho First resulted in IFB being in privity with 
Anaconda." R. Vol. V, p. 1097. That statement is simply not true, and it was error for the 
district court to accept it. There is no dispute that IFB was not a party to the Federal Case. IFB, 
however, attempts to bootstrap an argument that it was in privity with Anaconda/Portfolio, and 
therefore, "stands in the shoes of Anaconda and is the 'same party' for purposes of res judicata." 
Id. at 1061. IFB distorted the record in arguing that 'the Court made this determination in the 
Federal Case." Id. 
What the federal court found was that IFB materially breached the terms and conditions 
of the FDIC auction, that IFB was disqualified as a bidder or prospective purchaser, and that IFB 
never obtained an interest in the Stilwyn Loan. R. Vol. II, p. 315-16. It further found that, as an 
assignee of IFB, Anaconda stands in no better position than IFB. Id. at 313. The federal court 
concluded that the purported assignment between IFB and Anaconda was invalid. Id at 316. 
It is absurd for IFB to argue that it now gets the benefit of claim preclusion by way of 
privity based on an invalid assignment and Anaconda's role in the Federal Case declaratory 
judgment action. The federal court found that IFB was a wrongdoer and that its purported 
assignment to Anaconda was invalidated by its own material breach of the auction rules. The 
federal court held IFB had nothing to assign, and that Anaconda did not receive anything. Id 
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The district court cited Ticor for the proposition that a privy is a person not a party to the 
former action who derives his interest from one who was a party to it. R. Vol. V, p. 1096. IFB 
did not derive any interest from Anaconda or Portfolio. And the federal court held that 
Anaconda derived no interest from IFB. "Derive" is defined "to take, receive, or obtain 
especially from a specific source." Merriam-Webster.com (July 3, 2014 ). IFB did not obtain, 
take, or receive anything from Anaconda. And Anaconda did not obtain, take or receive 
anything from IFB. IFB and Anaconda are not privies. 
Whether this Court concludes that IFB and Anaconda enjoyed some form of privity is 
immaterial to the Rule 13(a) analysis. IFB suffers from the same defect as Anaconda/Portfolio. 
Neither it, nor any privy, ever made a claim against Stilwyn. Anaconda never made a claim 
against Stilwyn. IFB cannot pretend that it did. 
2. Stilwyn Was Not Required to Assert Any Claim or Counterclaim in 
the Federal Case. As a Result, the Doctrine of Res Judicata does not 
Apply. 
The second requirement for claim preclusion is same claims. The analysis and argument 
articulated above fully sets forth the reasons why the claims asserted in Stilwyn's Second 
Amended Complaint are not and were not compulsory counterclaims in the Federal Case. See 
discussion supra Parts. V., A-B. The "same claim" requirement is not met. 
3. The Amended Judgment Entered in the Federal Case is Not a "Final 
Judgment" for Purposes of Claim Preclusion Against Stilwyn. 
One of the consequences of the district court's misapplying the compulsory counterclaim 
and third-party claim rules resulted in the district court's failure to properly analyze the "final 
judgment" requirement for claim preclusion. Having decided that Stilwyn "could have and 
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should have" asserted compulsory counterclaims and third-party claims left the district court 
with no choice but to conclude that the Amended Judgment "decided all issues brought or that 
could have been brought based on the facts arising out [of] the Stilwyn Loan/FDIC transaction." 
R. Vol. V, p. 1100. That conclusion may be true for Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC, but it is 
certainly not true for Stilwyn. 
The district court misread Stilwyn's argument that the Amended Judgment was not 
operative against Stilwyn for purposes of claim preclusion. Stilwyn did not argue that the 
Amended Judgment was defective or that the district court should alter or amend it. The district 
court's suggestion that Stilwyn should have filed some sort of attack in the Federal Case or 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit is misplaced. There was nothing to appeal. Stilwyn' s position 
prevailed on the declaratory judgment issue. It was not a party to the Stipulation or adversely 
affected by the Amended Judgment- and properly so on the record in the Federal Case. What 
was there for Stilwyn to appeal from? 
The following procedural history in the Federal Case shows how the Amended Judgment 
is not effective against Stilwyn for purposes of claim preclusion: 
• Anaconda/Portfolio brought a declaratory judgment action against the FDIC 
seeking a judicial declaration as to the rightful holder of the 58% interest in the 
Stilwyn Loan. The FDIC filed a counterclaim as to the ownership of the Loan 
under a federal statute and included a claim for its own slander of title damages. 
Stilwyn intervened, but did not assert any affirmative claims and no affirmative 
claims were made against it. 
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• On cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Anaconda/Portfolio and the 
FDIC, the federal court held that the FDIC was the rightful holder of the 58% 
interest. It also held that Idaho First Bank never acquired any interest or right 
from the FDIC. Thus, the purported assignment between IFB and Anaconda/ 
Portfolio failed as a matter of law and had no legal effect. 
• After the court's summary judgment decision, the only remaining claim was the 
FD I C's slander of title claim. Stilwyn filed a motion to join in that claim as a 
"defacto" party, but the motion was withdrawn without being ruled upon. Since 
the matter was never subject to a ruling, Stilwyn's motion had no consequence in 
the Federal Case. 
• The parties to the only remaining claim in the Federal Case-the slander of title 
claim (FDIC and Anaconda/Portfolio) then stipulated to dismiss that claim 
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l). Consistent with their position that Stilwyn was not a 
party to the FDIC's slander of title claim, Stilwyn was not involved in or a party 
to the Stipulation for Dismissal. Excluding Stilwyn from the Stipulation was 
entirely consistent with Stilwyn's status as an intervenor with no claims made by 
it or against it. 18 
18 Stilwyn did not sign the Stipulation for Dismissal. Although binding and effective against 
Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC, the Amended Judgment is ineffective against Stilwyn for 
purposes of claim preclusion. See e.g., Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, S.Ct.Civ. 2012-
0050, 2012 WL 5499863, *7 (V.I. Nov. 7, 2012) (stipulation does not quality for treatment as a 
unanimous document); Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. US. Forest Serv., Civ.A.08-
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• The Amended Judgment that resulted from the Stipulation for Dismissal 
established that no one (including the Court) considered Stilwyn a party to the 
dismissal of the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim. 
The actual language of the Amended Judgment also shows that it is not effective as 
against Stilwyn. The Amended Judgment states in its entirety: 
The Court enters this Amended Judgment to clarify its earlier 
Judgment. The Court indicated that the original Judgment was 
entered in accordance with the Order issued concurrently therewith 
(Dkt. 72). That Order was based on the Stipulation for 
Dismissal (Dkt. 71), which set forth the parties' stipulation to 
dismiss the one remaining claim in this case - FDIC-R's 
slander of title counterclaim. However, the stipulation also 
indicated that the parties acknowledged that the Court's 
earlier Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. 41) had 
already resolved all other claims among the parties. 
Accordingly, this Amended Judgment is entered in accordance 
with both the Order dismissing the slander of title claim (Dkt. 72) 
and the Memorandum Decision and Order resolving all other 
claims among the parties (Dkt. 41). Accordingly, 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that this case be dismissed in its entirety. 
R. Vol. IV, p. 889-90 (emphasis added). 
The Amended Judgment provides that the parties to the Stipulation - Anaconda/ Portfolio 
and the FDIC - acknowledge that the Court's earlier Order had already resolved all other claims 
among the parties (i.e., Anaconda/Portfolio and FDIC). It did not, however, adjudicate any claim 
323ERIE, 2009 WL 1324154, *2 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2009) (dismissal is ineffective where 
intervenor's signature not obtained). 
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involving Stilwyn because Stilwyn was only an intervenor and had not made any claims or had 
claims made against it. 
By its terms, the Amended Judgment is not and cannot operate as a valid, final judgment 
for purposes of claim preclusion against Stilwyn on its claims in this case. "For claim preclusion 
to apply, the prior judgment must be a valid final judgment rendered on the merits." Andrus v. 
Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 778, 186 P.3d 630,634 (2008). The Amended Judgment resolved the 
merits of the declaratory judgment claims and, based on the Stipulation, resolved "the one 
remaining claim in this case - FDIC-R's slander oftitle counterclaim." That's all it purports to 
do and all it was intended to do. It does nothing more. 
The Amended Judgment does nothing to adjudicate, address, or resolve any claims 
Stilwyn has alleged here. Apart from the established rules of law regarding the litigation of 
counterclaims, the Amended Judgment underscores, in perhaps the strongest terms possible, that 
the Federal Case cannot be used to prevent Stilwyn from having its day in an Idaho state court. 
Stilwyn is not seeking to relitigate any issue or claim from the Federal Case. 
The Amended Judgment did not adjudicate any claims or compulsory counterclaims 
involving Stilwyn and, therefore, does not operate for purposes of claim preclusion against 
Stilwyn as a "valid final judgment." 
E. No PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH IN FAVOR OF APPLYING RES 
JUDICATA TO DENY STILWYN ITS DAY IN COURT. 
Public policy compels that Stilwyn be given its day in court. There are no public policy 
considerations underlying the doctrine of res judicata impaired by allowing Stilwyn to litigate its 
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claims against these Defendants. This Court has expressed three fundamental policy purposes 
behind the application of res judicata: (1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute 
resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice 
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the 
burdens ofrepetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the 
harassment ofrepetitive claims. Ticor Title, 144 Idaho 123, 157 P.3d at 613 (citations omitted). 
None of the three policy purposes are implicated here. No one is litigating or attempting 
to relitigate anything that was decided in the Federal Case. There cannot be inconsistent results. 
Stilwyn's claims have not been alleged or previously litigated, so there is no threat of repetitious 
litigation or harassment from repetitive claims. Stilwyn is entitled to its day in court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Stilwyn respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of summary 
judgment. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Stilwyn did not have any legal duty or 
obligation to assert claims in the Federal Case. Stilwyn did not have any compulsory 
counterclaims because Anaconda/Portfolio was not an "opposing party." And Stilwyn was not 
compelled to assert claims against non-parties. Moreover, this is an appropriate case to adopt 
and apply the declaratory judgment exception of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 
Finally, the elements of claim preclusion have not been met based on the Federal Case, and the 
Amended Judgment is not operative against Stilwyn for purposes of claim preclusion. For these 
reasons, the Court should reverse the summary judgment decision and remand this case for trial. 
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